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Abstract
This paper focuses on the constitutional rights of limited-English-proficiency suspects in the United States during two pre-trial 
stages: arrest and custodial interrogation. Specifically, the paper addresses the constitutional violations arising from the linguistic 
barriers between these suspects and law enforcement authorities. The paper proposes a solution in the form of statutory 
provisions requiring the active participation of well-qualified interpreters and translators
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Scientific Committee of the XXXIII AESLA CONFERENCE.
Keywords: Interpretation; Translation; United States of America; Constitutional Law
1. Introduction
According to a 2011 report by the U.S. Census Bureau, of the 291.5 million people aged 5 and over living in the 
United States, 60.6 million people —or 21%— speak a language other than English at home (Ryan, 2013, p. 1). Of 
these 60.6 million speakers, 13.5 million —or 22.4%— self-evaluate their English oral proficiency as “not well” or 
“not at all” (Ryan, 2013, p. 1). This high number of limited-English-proficiency (LEP) speakers also has 
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constitutional protections, as the U.S. Supreme Court first held in Meyer v. Nebraska (1923). In this decision, the 
Court invalidated a statute that forbade foreign-language instruction for children who had not completed the eighth 
grade. The Court reasoned that the Constitution also protects “those who speak other languages,” and that the 
government may not promote the “desirable end” that all of these speakers understand (and, presumably, speak) 
English through “prohibited means.” In this case, the Court found the English-Only mandate to infringe upon certain 
fundamental rights safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, namely the foreign-language 
teachers’ right to teach, the students’ right to acquire knowledge, and the parents’ right “to control the education of 
their own.”
Lower courts have also played an active role confirming the panoply of constitutional protections afforded LEP 
speakers. For instance, the appellate court in United States ex rel. Negrón v. New York (1970) established the 
constitutional right to a courtroom interpreter. In that case, the LEP defendant was unable to understand the 
testimony made against him in English, in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, which guarantees 
criminal defendants the right to confront adverse witnesses, and know the nature of the charges and evidence against 
them. As the appellate court ruled in United States v. Carrión (1973, p. 14), the right to an interpreter rests 
essentially on the notion that no defendant “should face the Kafkaesque spectre of an incomprehensible ritual which 
may terminate in punishment.”
2. The Miranda warnings applied to LEP suspects
Constitutional protections for the LEP population are also triggered at the pre-trial stages of arrest and 
interrogation. In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the defendant had been arrested and taken to an interrogation room, 
where he signed a confession stating that he had confessed voluntarily, with full knowledge of his legal rights and 
with the understanding that his statements might be used against him. The confession was then admitted as evidence 
at trial, which ended with the defendant’s conviction for kidnapping and rape. The Supreme Court, however, held 
that the defendant had not been apprised of his Fifth-Amendment right to compelled self-incrimination, and his 
Sixth-Amendment right to counsel. As a result, the Court mandated the enumeration of certain constitutional rights 
whenever an individual is taken into custody: the popularly known as “Miranda rights” or “Miranda warnings.” 
Specifically, the suspect must be advised that s/he has the right to remain silent; that anything s/he says can be used 
against him/her in a court of law; that s/he has the right to the presence of an attorney; and that if s/he cannot afford 
an attorney, one will be appointed for him/her before questioning if s/he so wishes (p. 479). If the authorities fail to 
convey any of these warnings to the suspect during their encounter, any statement made by the suspect will be 
suppressed at trial. However, the suspect may waive his/her rights, provided that s/he does so voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently (1969, p. 444). Put differently, the relinquishment must result from “a free and 
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, . . . [the suspect must be fully aware of] 
the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of . . . [abandoning] it” (Moran v. Burbine, 1986, p. 
421).
Furthermore, the suspect must be given the opportunity to exercise these rights throughout the interrogation, not 
just upon arrest (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, p. 479). In fact, the suspect can re-assert his/her Miranda rights, even 
after waiving them (Rogers, Rogstad, Gillard, Drogin, Blackwood, & Shuman, 2010, p. 304). A suspect, for 
example, may begin speaking to police officers, and then reassert his/her right to remain silent or refuse to answer 
certain questions, and still be confident that his/her silence will not be used against him/her (U.S. v. Scott, 1995, p. 
907).
Unsurprisingly, constitutional challenges in the context of police arrest and custodial interrogation normally 
focus on the adequacy of the Miranda warnings, and the validity of the defendant’s waiver. Put differently, if the 
suspect cannot understand the police when they conveyed the Miranda rights to him/her, it follows that s/he was also 
unable to understand the nature of the rights involved, and the repercussions of waiving them. To establish the 
degree of freedom of the suspect’s choice and his/her level of comprehension, courts consider the “totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” (e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 1979, p. 725).
258   Manuel Triano-López /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  212 ( 2015 )  256 – 260 
These issues tend to surface not only with English-dominant suspects who are limited in mental development, but 
also with LEP suspects due to their unfamiliarity with the U.S. legal system and/or the language barrier. As the 
appellate court in United States v. Martinez (sic) assumed —“without so holding”—, if Miranda warnings are given 
in a language that the suspect does not understand, “a waiver of those rights would not be valid” (1978, p. 1235). 
Other lower courts have adopted that reasoning. In United States v. Garibay (1998), the convicted defendant moved 
to suppress the incriminating statements he had made during interrogation, arguing that he did not understand the 
recitation of his Miranda rights in English because of his LEP and limited mental capacity (p. 536). Concerning his 
limited-English skills, the court considered the defendant’s poor grades in English while attending high school in the 
United States; his failure to graduate from high school; and the witnesses who testified that they always 
communicated with the defendant in Spanish at his request. One of the witnesses, in particular, testified that the 
defendant often claimed to understand English when interacting with persons of authority, even though “he did not 
understand what was being said to him” (p. 538). The court then concluded that the defendant did not understand his 
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel, nor that he had the option to waive those 
rights knowingly and intelligently (p. 538).
As pointed out above, the validity of the waiver depends on the facts and circumstances of each case (Edwards v. 
Arizona, 1981, p. 482). Accordingly, when law enforcement authorities have conveyed the Miranda rights to the 
LEP suspect in his/her first language (either directly or via an interpreter/translator), courts do not rely solely on the 
quality of the translation/interpretation to determine whether to suppress the suspect’s incriminating statements 
(Rogers, Correa, Hazelwood, Shuman, Hoersting, & Blackwood, 2009, p. 61). In State v. Ortez (2006), the 
defendant presented testimony of a certified English/Spanish interpreter who pointed out some errors in the 
translation of the Miranda warnings read to him. For example, the translation contained the Spanish phrase corte de 
ley —a word-by-word translation of the English phrase “court of law”—, which has no meaning in Spanish. The 
interpreter also testified that the waiver did not mention that an attorney would be appointed for the defendant if he 
were not able to afford one. In fact, the Spanish translation of this right read as follows: “If you want a lawyer and 
cannot get one, for you one will be named for you so that for you he can represent you during the interrogatory” (p. 
245).
In its decision, the court relied on Duckworth v. Eagan, in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Miranda 
warnings did not have to “be given in the exact form described in . . . [the 1966 Miranda] decision” (1989, p. 202). 
Despite the lexical and grammatical mistakes in the Spanish translation, the court noted that the defendant had 
answered affirmatively when he was asked in Spanish whether he understood his rights, and that the Spanish 
rendition reasonably conveyed to the defendant his Miranda rights, including the right to have counsel named for 
him (p. 245).
Similarly, the defendant in Albarrán v. State (2011) moved to suppress his statements to the police because of the 
flawed Spanish rendition of the Miranda rights. Specifically, the interpreter — a Spanish professor at the University 
of Alabama and a teacher at the Police Academy— used the made-up word silento for “silent,” and informed the 
defendant that if he did not have any money, an attorney would be “selected to represent [him],” instead of 
“appointed [for him] (at the State’s expense)” (p. 151). The Court, however, ruled that the understanding of the 
Miranda warnings depends on the totality of the circumstances, not solely the skill of the interpreter/translator (p. 
150). In this case, the court held that the rendition of the Miranda rights “clearly expressed the required concepts,” 
and, thus, did not invalidate the defendant’s waiver (p. 151). Conversely, in a 2011 aggravated-murder case, the 
judge granted the suppression because a Spanish interpreter working for the police had omitted that the suspect 
could end the interview with the police at any time (Futty, 2011, June 6).
Because of their inferior linguistic training and the stress of having to perform two roles simultaneously, 
allegedly bilingual officers do not fare better than interpreters/translators in their rendition of the Miranda warnings. 
Some interpretations/translations are unintentionally comical, such as Tiene el derecho de quedar en calado “You 
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have the right to remain whitewashed’’ instead of Tiene derecho a permanecer en silencio (Crowle, 2006, cited in 
Rogers, Correa, Hazelwood, Shuman, Hoersting, & Blackwood, 2009, p. 65). From these comical examples, it 
follows that that the overall encounter with the LEP suspect would be riddled with even more mistakes, some of
them substantial enough to merit the suppression of the incriminating statements. In People v. Aguilar-Ramos
(2004), the defendant had been informed of his rights and interrogated in Spanish by a police detective who 
admitted to having struggled with several words during the interrogation (a certified court interpreter acting as an 
expert witness testified that the detective did not know several Spanish words crucial to the sexual assault charge, 
like “vagina,” “penis,” or “condom”), to the point of seeking assistance from three Spanish-speaking officers, none 
of whom was available at the time. The Court found that the detective’s limited Spanish skills led to a disjointed 
scene, where each party “frequently had no idea what the other was talking about” (p. 402). For example, when the 
defendant asked about his right to an attorney, the detective either ignored or misunderstood his questions. Having 
considered “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation”, the court concluded that the defendant 
“clearly did not understand his rights sufficiently to waive them” (p. 402).
These errors and their legal repercussions are not sporadic. Rogers, Correa, Hazelwood, Shuman, Hoersting, & 
Blackwood (2009) gathered a corpus of 121 Spanish translations of Miranda rights. Results revealed a substantial 
number of omissions of one of the rights, and substantive errors in the form of mangled syntax, such as “In the cause 
in that which you are accused of” for “at trial.” Other linguistics errors in the corpus —namely, made-up words such 
as suada for “used, ” as in “Anything you say can be used against you in a court of law”— could also result in the 
suppression of the suspect’s incriminating statements. Hence the need for solutions to minimize the number of 
violations of the LEP suspect’s rights upon arrest and during custodial interrogation.
Legislators, for example, could pass laws requiring the active participation of certified interpreters and translators 
whenever possible. A precedent exists in the 1978 Federal Court Interpreters Act, which requires certified 
interpreters “for LEP participants in all criminal cases and in civil cases brought by the U.S. government” (Abel, 
2013, p. 593). Candidates for certification must pass a rigorous two-part examination.
Under the new legislation, police departments would make every reasonable effort to secure the services of 
competent interpreters and translators. The former, for instance, could assist authorities during the interrogation 
phase, whereas the latter could help ensure the use of error-free Miranda warning cards upon arrest.
3. Conclusions
Strained communication between English-dominant law enforcement personnel and LEP suspects can jeopardize 
the integrity of the U.S. judicial process (Venkatraman, April 2006). Therefore, lawmakers should consider passing 
legislation requiring the active participation of well-qualified interpreters and translators not only at trial, but also at 
the crucially important stages of arrest and interrogation.
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